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California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside
Delivery, LLC, 888 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018)
Mitch L. WerBell V
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in California Department of
Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC reminds prospective
purchasers of tax-defaulted property of their responsibility for due
diligence. The case addressed the reach of the third-party defense to a
CERCLA cost recovery action. The court determined that CERCLA’s
third-party defense did not apply to a company which purchased a
contaminated property at a tax auction because of its “contractual
relationship” with the former owner-polluter and because the relevant
contaminating acts occurred “in connection with” the prior polluter’s
ownership of the site.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary issue in California Department of Toxic Substances
Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC1 was one of first impression for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—whether the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act’s (“CERCLA”) third-party defense extends to a tax-sale purchaser of
a contaminated property.2 Specifically, the court sought to determine
whether, under CERCLA, a tax-sale purchaser of a contaminated site had
a “contractual relationship” with the prior owner-contaminator and, if so,
whether the pollution at issue in the litigation occurred “in connection with
[their] contractual relationship.”3 For its analysis, the court emphasized
CERCLA federal law, not state law, would control.4 The court ascertained
that Congress intended to treat tax-sale purchasers the same as ordinary
purchasers when the CERCLA-related Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) was enacted.5 Moreover, the court held
Westside Delivery, LLC (“Westside”), the tax-sale purchaser of the
contaminated site, had a contractual relationship with that property’s prior
owner, as that term is defined in CERCLA.6 Finally, the court concluded
that the prior owner’s contaminating acts––its release of hazardous
substances while owning the property––occurred in connection to its
contractual relationship with Westside.7

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

888 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1088.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2018)) (discussing the third of
CERLA’s three affirmative defenses to liability).
Id. at 1093–1094.
Id. at 1091–1092, 1098; see also Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986).
Id. at 1091–1092.
Id. at 1101.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Davis Chemical Company (“Davis”) owned a facility (“Site”)
in Los Angeles where it recycled used solvents from 1949 to 1990.8 The
California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) ordered
Davis to stop all hazardous-waste-related activities in October 1990.9 Two
years later, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
recommended that DTSC investigate and remediate the Site.10 DTSC then
identified former Davis customers as potentially responsible parties
(“PRPs”) that might be liable for remediation costs pursuant to CERCLA,
but never successfully implemented a remediation agreement.11 During
DTSC’s efforts to locate other PRPs to bear remediation costs, the Los
Angeles County Tax Collector held a tax auction in August 2009 because
Davis had failed to pay the Site’s property taxes.12 Westside submitted the
highest bid for the Site and received a tax deed in September 2009.13
Importantly, the tax auction materials advised bidders that they bore the
responsibility to investigate the Site, notwithstanding the site’s absence
from a “not exhaustive” list of “Potentially Contaminated Parcels”
included in those auction materials.14 Subsequent to 2009, Westside did
not conduct any operations at the Site.15
Meanwhile, from 2010 to 2015, DTSC remediated the Site and
later brought a cost recovery action against Westside under CERCLA.16 In
turn, Westside asserted CERCLA’s third-party defense, which shields a
party from liability if it can demonstrate that the damages from a release
or threat of release of hazardous substances were caused solely by an actor
other than “one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant.”17 Westside argued that the third-party defense precluded it
from liability because other third parties, including Davis, caused the
Site’s contamination and because Westside did not enter a contractual
relationship with those third parties under CERCLA.18 The district court
agreed and awarded Westside summary judgment, after which DTSC
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.19 The Ninth Circuit reversed that district

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. (A group of environmental consultants also completed a study in
1996 which found that the Site’s soil possessed several hazardous
substances at elevated levels.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1089–1091 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1089–1090.
Id. at 1090.
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court ruling and remanded the case to determine the extent of Westside’s
liability and its related required contribution toward cleanup costs.20
III. ANALYSIS
To analyze the two principle issues in this case––whether the tax
deed created a contractual relationship as interpreted by CERCLA, and
whether the relevant contamination occurred in connection with that
contractual relationship21––the court discussed both CERCLA and
connected laws, including the clarifying SARA amendments, their related
defenses and definitions, and the California tax-sale structure.22
A. CERCLA & SARA
CERCLA, a strict liability statute, was enacted “in response to the
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.”23
Relevant to this action, CERCLA’s framework permits a state to recover
its costs of responding to a “release” or “threatened release” of hazardous
substances from a site’s owner, even if the owner did not place the
substances at the site.24 The critical element requires the defendant-owner
to have owned the site at the time when the state responded.25 The court
conducted a thorough examination of the term contractual relationship in
the 1986 SARA, a statute “aimed at speeding cleanup and forcing quicker
action by the EPA.”26 SARA included the “innocent-landowner defense”
as a new type of third-party defense and gave definition to the formerly
undefined term “contractual relationship.”27 The statute provides, in
relevant part, that “[t]he term ‘contractual relationship’ includes, but is not
limited to, land contracts, deeds . . . or other instruments transferring title

20.
21
22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1088–1089.
Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1092–1093 (citing Carloss v. County of Alameda, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 784, 791, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing California’s
tax-sale system for context with the contractual relationship
analysis); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 126, 3436, 3691(a)(1)(A) (In
California, the tax collector must attempt to sell a tax-defaulted
property at an auction directly to a private party.)).
Id. at 1090 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009)); see also Marsh v. Rosenbloom,
499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (also discussing CERCLA, at 42
U.S.C. § 9601(9)(b), as reactionary in that it “‘looks backward in time
and imposes wide-ranging liability’ on parties who are in some way
responsible for contaminating a facility”).
Id. at 1090 (citing Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc.,
710 F.3d 946, 956–957 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Id. (citing California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Hearthside
Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 1091 (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. V. Unocal Corp., 270
F.3d 863, 887 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Id.

2018

WESTSIDE DELIVERY, LLC

4

or possession.”28 The innocent-landowner defense applies only when a
private, nongovernmental purchaser did not have actual or constructive
knowledge of contamination at the time of purchase, or when the facility
was acquired by inheritance.29 The court recognized that SARA “clarified”
that a third party can include prior owners whose acts or omissions
occurred in the past.30 The court reasoned that “a defendant landowner has
a contractual relationship with all previous landowners—or, at least all
previous landowners in the chain of title—unless the defendant-landowner
can qualify for the innocent-landowner defense.”31
Additionally, the court addressed the role of state law in the
analysis of whether a contractual relationship existed between Davis and
Westside.32 The court found no “plain indication”33 that Congress intended
that state law should be used to interpret whether an instrument or
transaction creates a contractual relationship under SARA.34 Accordingly,
the court used the federal CERCLA statutes to ascertain whether the
transactions related to Davis’s and Westside’s property interests amounted
to a contractual relationship.35
B. Contractual Relationship
The court then analyzed Westside’s tax-sale purchase through two
lenses, both of which led to the same conclusion: a contractual relationship
existed between Westside and Davis.36 Because a tax sale could be viewed
as either a single or two transactions—one between the government and
the defaulting landowner and another between the government and the
subsequent purchaser receiving a new title—the court clarified that under
California’s tax sale structure, the government never acquires a possessory
interest in tax-defaulted property sold at an auction to a private party.37
To begin, the court assessed the relationship between Westside
and Davis under a single transaction view.38 The court determined that the
definition of “contractual relationship” should be broadly construed.39 The
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1091–1092 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1092 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)).
Id. (citing Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 887).
Id. (citing Buffalo Marine Servs. Inc. v. United States, 663 F.3d 750,
755, 758 (5th Cir. 2011) (referring to the Oil Pollution Act); United
States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Id. (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 43 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, 848
F.3d 1216, 1229 (9th Cir. 2017) (The contractual relationship
definition “contains both an ‘includes, but is not limited to’ clause
and a ‘catch-all’ clause.” (internal citation omitted)).
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court looked at use of the phrase “other involuntary transfer” under the
definition of “contractual relationship” and found that it necessarily
implies that a contractual relationship can exist even where property is
transferred without both parties’ consent, such as a tax sale.40 Because the
tax deed divested Davis’s interest in the Site and vested Westside with the
right to possession, the property was transferred, albeit involuntarily,
through a tax collector; the court found that this involuntary transfer fit
within the accepted and broad “contractual relationship” definition.41
Next, the court concluded that a contractual relationship existed
even if the tax sale was construed as two transactions.42 While the
relationship between the state and Westside was clearly a direct
contractual relationship, the court looked to the innocent-landowner
defense again to clarify that a contractual relationship also existed between
Davis and the state.43 Because that exception only applies if the defendant
is a government entity, the court found that the state’s acquisition of taxdelinquent property constituted an involuntary transfer.44
Ultimately and through a comprehensive view of CERCLA, the
court determined that Congress, by narrowly construing the innocentlandowner defense and broadly defining “contractual relationship,” did
not mean for CERCLA to apply to tax sale purchasers differently from
others.45 Rather, the court concluded that Congress intended the innocentlandowner defense to be the sole defense for private buyers of land
contaminated by previous owners, quoting the EPA’s own statement that
“‘there is no authority anywhere in CERCLA that would support the
laundering of liability’ through a mechanism such as a tax sale.”46
Accordingly, the court held that Westside, the tax-sale purchaser,
had a contractual relationship with Davis, the pre-tax-sale owner, with
regard to the Site’s transfer.47 In doing so, the court rejected Westside’s
three arguments that it had no relationship of any kind with Davis, that the
tax sale broke the chain of title, and that extending “contractual
relationship” to include a tax sale would render the third-party defense
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 8601(35)(A); Penn Terra Ltd. V. Dep’t
of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)).
Id. at 1095–1096.
Id. at 1096.
Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. 9601(35)(A)(ii)) (comparing 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(D) and 40 C.F.R. § 300.1105(a)).
Id. at 1097 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“goal when construing complex regulatory
statute is to ‘interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious
whole’”); Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 880, 883 (Through the
contractual relationship definition, Congress added the innocentlandowner defense, intending narrow applicability for fear of abuse.).
Id. at 1098 (citing National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan; Lender Liability under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344, 18,372–18,373) (Apr. 29, 1992)).
Id. at 1100.
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meaningless.48 The court stated that, because Congress explicitly defined
“contractual relationship,” its definition controlled.49 Further, the court
reiterated that state law did not govern, and thus, the chain of title
argument was moot because it already found an indirect contractual
relationship through the involuntary tax-sale transfer.50 Finally, the court
clarified that the “traditional” CERCLA third-party defense applies where
the property was previously contaminated, but only by “true” third parties
like vandals or midnight dumpers, or was contaminated “after the
defendant acquired the property.”51
C. In Connection With
Westside argued that Davis’s acts and omissions which
contaminated the Site did not occur “in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant,” entitling
it to CERCLA’s third-party defense.52 The court found Westside’s narrow
interpretation of “in connection with” incompatible with Congress’s intent
for the innocent-landowner defense; such a reading would allow nearly
every defendant to escape liability by claiming that the real-estate contract
or deed did not “relate to . . . hazardous substances.”53 Instead, the court
determined that where a defendant-landowner raises a liability defense due
to a previous owner or possessor’s acts or omissions, the “in connection
with” requirement is intended only to limit liability transfer where the
“previous owner’s polluting acts or omissions were unrelated to its status
as a landowner.”54 Because the court found that Davis released hazardous
pollutants as owner of the Site, it determined, those acts occurred “‘in
connection with’ its contractual relationship with [Westside].”55
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in California Department of Toxic Substances
Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC means CERCLA’s third-party defense
will rarely apply to tax-sale real estate buyers attempting to assert that
defense in response to a cost recovery action, at least those under Ninth
Circuit jurisdiction. Precedent now limits that defense while establishing
the constructive notice requirement is easily satisfied. Though extensive
due diligence is usually difficult to conduct in a tax auction setting given
their rapid-fire nature, the ruling nevertheless reminds buyers of both their
environmental responsibilities and their responsibility to investigate.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1099–1100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (Court raising a
limiting principle because “connections” are indeterminate).
Id.
Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
Id.

